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Constitutional Conversations 
Alison M. Latimer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines two cases that raise questions about the capacity to 
secure redress for the limitation of Charter1 rights through litigation. It gives 
expression to a certain litigation fatigue stemming from processes of 
litigation and then legislative or practice reform that at times feel 
dysfunctional. While the to and fro between the courts and state actors has 
sometimes been described as a “dialogue”,2 this paper does not weigh in on 
the question of whether dialogue theory legitimates judicial review. It 
focuses instead on a consideration of a prerequisite to a functional 
constitutional conversation. A functional constitutional conversation would 
build on the insights of both speakers and thereby lean towards rights 
recognition and access to justice. 
The prerequisite here considered is respectful attention to what is said by 
the participants in the conversation. In the courtroom, two different kinds of 
failure to attend to what is being said are examined: the first is not 
answering what is asked, and the second is answering what is not asked. 
Thus, in this context, respectful attention requires courts to address 
constitutional issues that properly arise in a case and are fully developed by 
the parties and restraint from commenting upon constitutional issues that 
are not framed by the parties. The benefit of that approach is that a full 
                                                                                                                       
* Alison M. Latimer is a partner at Arvay Finlay LLP and was co-counsel to the appellants in 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, 2015 SCC 5 (S.C.C.), 
along with Joseph J. Arvay, O.C., Q.C. and Sheila Tucker, Q.C. and co-counsel to the appellant in B.C. 
Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2017] S.C.J. 
No. 6, 2017 SCC 6 (S.C.C.), along with Sean Hern. This chapter was originally presented at the 2018 
Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference. The author is grateful for the thoughtful questions and 
commentary from conference participants and the reviewer, all of which advanced the thinking in the 
piece. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 75; Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited – Or 
‘Much Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; Jamie Cameron, “Collateral Thoughts on 
Dialogue’s Legacy as Metaphor and Theory: A Favourite from Canada” (2016) 35 U.Q.L.J. 157. 
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factual matrix with input from both parties (almost invariably including a 
state representative) should be available on the constitutional issues 
adjudicated upon. Further, considered submissions on the constitutional 
questions raised (almost invariably including from the Attorney General or 
other state representative), will likely be available to assist the court. And 
finally, this respectful attention would ensure that judgments are both 
responsive and understandable to, and of some utility to the parties who 
may one day have to respond to them.  
On the ground, or in the legislature, this respectful attention would require 
that court judgments are considered and given weight by those who respond 
to them. Legislative or operational responses should be complete and respond 
to the judgments themselves, not simply reiterate positions taken and 
addressed by the courts in prior litigation.3 This respectful attention does not 
mean that state actors do not have a range of legislative or operational 
responses available to them, but that the range is necessarily constrained 
when it is part of a continuing constitutional conversation with the courts. 
This paper is organized in four parts. In Part II, the principle of restraint 
is explored. In Part III, a critique of Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)4 
and the legislative reform that followed is advanced. The focus here is on 
the drawbacks of the approach to the principle of restraint as applied by the 
Court in respect of constitutional questions that were fully developed 
through the litigation. In particular, how the Court’s failure to comment 
upon each of the constitutional issues properly arising in the case interfered 
with a fulsome legislative response, and resulted in undesirable sequel 
litigation and untold human suffering. In Part IV, a critique of B.C. Freedom 
of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General)5 and Elections BC’s response to it is advanced. In this critique, the 
problem flows from the opposite direction but with similar negative 
impacts on the constitutional conversation. Here, the Court answered a 
constitutional question that no one had asked. The dysfunction arises in the 
wake of the litigation when the unnecessary constitutional pronouncement 
confounds those who must respond to it and prejudices future cases with 
unexamined consequences. 
                                                                                                                       
3 This view of what a legitimate government response to a judicial judgment entails is drawn 
from the jurisprudence giving content to the standard of legitimacy and rationality that relates to the 
judicial compensation commission process set out in Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. 
New Brunswick (Minister of Justice), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, 2005 SCC 44, at paras. 23-27 (S.C.C.). 
4 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, 2015 SCC 5 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”]. 
5 B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2017] S.C.J. No. 6, 2017 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “BC FIPA SCC”]. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLE OF RESTRAINT 
Notwithstanding the relaxation of the rules of public interest standing,6 
there remains a general though not invariable principle that courts avoid 
making constitutional pronouncements when cases can be decided on other 
grounds. Citing Professor Hogg, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
explained the principle of restraint as follows: 
[42] The fact that a party has standing to make a constitutional 
argument, however, does not compel a court to rule on that argument. 
There is a general (though not invariable) principle that courts avoid 
making constitutional pronouncements when cases can be decided on 
less esoteric bases. Professor Hogg puts it this way: 
A case that is properly before a court may be capable of decision 
on a non-constitutional ground or a constitutional ground or both. 
The course of judicial restraint is to decide the case on the non-
constitutional ground. That way, the dispute between the litigants 
is resolved, but the impact of a constitutional decision on the 
powers of the legislative or executive branches of government is 
avoided. For the same reason, if a case can be decided on a 
narrow constitutional ground or a wide ground, the narrow 
ground is to be preferred. If a case can be decided on a rule of 
federalism or under the Charter, the federalism ground is the 
narrower one, because it leaves the other level of government free 
to act, whereas a Charter decision striking down a law does not. 
The general idea is that a proper deference to the other branches 
of government makes it wise for the courts, as far as possible, to 
frame their decisions in ways that do not intrude gratuitously on 
the powers of the other branches. 
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. supplemented) 
(looseleaf) Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007 (updated to 2013), §59.5, 
p. 59-227 
In Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray 
Mine Tragedy),8 the Supreme Court of Canada described the rationales 
for the principle of restraint, noting that “unnecessary constitutional 
pronouncements may prejudice future cases, the implications of which 
                                                                                                                       
6 Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence 
Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, 2012 SCC 45 (S.C.C.). 
7 R. v. Lloyd, [2014] B.C.J. No. 1212, 2014 BCCA 224 (B.C.C.A.), revd [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, 
2016 SCC 16 (S.C.C.). 
8 [1995] S.C.J. No. 36, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 (S.C.C.). 
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have not been foreseen.”9 The Court highlighted that the development of 
Charter jurisprudence “must ... be a careful process” and that “[w]here 
issues do not compel commentary on these new Charter provisions, none 
should be undertaken.”10 
The question, then, is when are constitutional pronouncements 
“necessary” and when do issues “compel commentary” upon 
constitutional grounds? Below, by examining two recent judgments of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, it is developed that access to justice 
compels commentary upon constitutional issues that properly arise in a 
case and are fully developed by the parties and compels restraint from 
commenting upon constitutional issues that are not framed by the parties. 
III. CARTER V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
Respectful attention was lacking in the Carter case and the 
Parliamentary response that followed. Here, the Court declined to address 
each constitutional argument that was fully developed by the parties before 
it. Failing to do so, the Court essentially ignored significant aspects of what 
one speaker in the constitutional conversation was communicating. The 
judgment that followed necessarily provided less guidance to Parliament 
who was tasked to respond than it otherwise could have. That is a bad thing 
when one considers not only the temporal and financial resources such 
cases entail, but the human costs as well. 
At issue in Carter was the criminal law’s absolute prohibition against 
physician-assisted dying. The prohibition applied to all persons suffering 
from all medical conditions regardless of whether or not they were 
decisionally capable. The appellants challenged the law arguing that the 
absolute prohibition engaged the rights to “life, liberty and security of the 
person” under section 7 of the Charter and that it did so in a manner that 
was not consistent with the principles of fundamental justice that laws not 
be arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate.  
The appellants further argued that the absolute prohibition imposed a 
significant burden on the materially physically disabled that was not 
imposed upon able-bodied person. It did so by (a) standing between them 
and a timely end to suffering, leaving them the choice of either suffering 
longer than they wish or, in order to be autonomous, acting to die earlier 
                                                                                                                       
9 Id., at para. 9. 
10 Id., at para. 11, citing Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] S.C.J. No 18, 
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at 383 (S.C.C.). 
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than they otherwise would; (b) robbing them of the quality of their 
remaining life; and/or (c) subjecting them to psychological suffering related 
to imperilling others. In doing so, it was argued that the absolute prohibition 
discriminated against materially physically disabled persons. 
Both sides of each argument was supported by a full factual matrix 
painstakingly developed by the parties. The issues were fully argued by 
both sides at each level of court, and substantively addressed by the trial 
judge, Smith J., who found the absolute prohibition to be overbroad, grossly 
disproportionate and discriminatory.11 
But the Supreme Court of Canada held that it was “unnecessary to 
decide” whether the absolute prohibition violates the principle against gross 
disproportionality in light of its conclusion that the prohibition was 
overbroad.12 It held it was “unnecessary” to decide whether the absolute 
prohibition violates section 15 of the Charter in light of its conclusion that 
the absolute prohibition violates section 7.13 
From a remedial perspective, those conclusions were sound. The 
absolute prohibition was declared to be void insofar as it prohibited 
“physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly 
consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes 
enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances 
of his or her condition.”14 I will refer to this class of people as the Carter 
Class. The declaration was therefore broad enough to encompass the 
grossly disproportionate effects of the law, and its discriminatory effects. 
But the shortfall in the Court’s reasoning manifested in the next phase of 
the constitutional dialogue. In response to the Carter decision, Parliament 
enacted section 241.2 of the Criminal Code,15 replacement legislation that 
permits only a subset of the Carter Class to access individual assessment 
for a physician-assisted death. Specifically left out of this replacement 
legislation are: (1) persons who are unbearably suffering from disabilities, 
illnesses or diseases that will either not end their lives or not end them for a 
long time, and whose death from some other cause like old age is not 
reasonably foreseeable; (2) persons who are unbearably suffering but who 
cannot (yet) be categorized as in “advanced state of irreversible decline in 
                                                                                                                       
11 At the Court of Appeal, the majority judgment turned on the doctrine of stare decisis such 
that the trial judge’s analysis was the last substantive word on these issues. 
12 Carter, supra, note 4, at para. 90.  
13 Id., at para. 93.  
14 Id., at para. 127. 
15 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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capability”; and (3) persons who are unbearably suffering with medical 
conditions that are not “incurable”, but for whom the means of cure is 
personally unacceptable. This excluded group remains in exactly the same 
position that they were in prior to the Carter litigation. 
And yet the Carter record had ample evidence concerning the effect of 
the absolute prohibition on this excluded group. This excluded group was 
very much the subject of consideration in the analysis of the absolute 
prohibition’s gross disproportionality and its discriminatory impact against 
the materially physically disabled.  
Thus, Parliament should be criticized for enacting a law that failed to 
meet the constitutional minimums articulated by the Court in Carter. The 
parliamentary response failed to consider and give weight to the Carter 
judgment and to respond to the judgment itself rather than simply 
reiterating positions taken and addressed by the Court. But equally, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to decline to answer each of the 
constitutional questions developed by the parties resulted in a judgment that 
provided less guidance than perhaps Parliament needed in terms of the 
specific constraints on the range of choices available to it for corrective 
legislation. Sequel litigation challenging section 241.2 of the Criminal 
Code has been launched. Even if it is not assumed that the Court would 
have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge in respect of the law’s 
grossly disproportionate and discriminatory impacts, the Court’s failure to 
address these arguments means the parties are left to advance the same 
constitutional arguments without the benefit of the Court’s guidance. 
More respectful attention from both the Court and Parliament in this 
instance, might have resulted in a more meaningful and functional 
constitutional conversation — one that leaned steadily towards rights 
recognition and access to justice instead of leaving whole subsets of the 
population behind and/or requiring time-consuming and expensive 
relitigation of the same issues. 
IV. B.C. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ASSN. V.  
BRITISH COLUMBIA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
The BC FIPA case offers another example of how constitutional 
conversations become dysfunctional when neither participant in a dialogue 
gives respectful attention to the other. The problem in this instance was 
judicial disregard for how a law was interpreted and enforced on the 
ground, and a focus instead on a constitutional question that no party had 
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asked or contested. The judgment that followed set a problematically low 
watermark for rights infringement justification and failed to provide 
guidance to Elections BC who had to respond to the judgment.  
At issue in BC FIPA was the restriction of vitally important political 
expression at a critical time in the democratic process. Section 239(1) 
of the Election Act requires individuals and organizations to register 
before they may “sponsor election advertising”.16 Election advertising 
is defined very broadly in section 228 of the Act.17 The scope of the 
term “election advertising” had been the subject of previous judicial 
commentary and was described by a unanimous British Columbia 
Court of Appeal as follows: 
Given that the content of what constitutes election advertising is now 
no different than in the 2008 amendments, it remains the same as was 
considered in BCTF. Clearly the provision that such advertising 
includes “an advertising message that takes a position on an issue with 
which a registered political party or candidate is associated” means it 
encompasses virtually any issue that may be the subject of political 
expression because political issues are almost always if not invariably 
associated with individual politicians and their parties whether they are 
members of the government or otherwise. It captures a seemingly 
limitless range of activities in which the government may be engaged, 
or some may consider it should be engaged. Labour relations, health 
and education services, consultations with First Nations, and 
environmental management may be cited as an indication of the scope 
of the issues that invite political expression in the form of third-party 
advertising on a continuing basis. It appears that any public 
                                                                                                                       
16 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 106 [hereinafter “Election Act” or “Act”].  
17 The Act, id., s. 228 (now repealed, S.B.C. 2017, c. 20, s. 29), provided:  
election advertising means the transmission to the public by any means, during 
the campaign period, of an advertising message that promotes or opposes, directly 
or indirectly, a registered political party or the election of a candidate, including 
an advertising message that takes a position on an issue with which a registered 
political party or candidate is associated, but does not include  
(a) the publication without charge of news, an editorial, an interview, a column, 
a letter, a debate, a speech or a commentary in a bona fide periodical 
publication or a radio or television program,  
(b) the distribution of a book, or the promotion of the sale of a book, for no less 
than its commercial value, if the book was planned to be made available to 
the public regardless of whether there was to be an election,  
(c) the transmission of a document directly by a person or a group to their 
members, employees or shareholders, or  
(d) the transmission by an individual, on a non-commercial basis on the 
internet, or by telephone or text messaging, of his or her personal political 
views. ...  
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communication on government action would be seen as “taking a 
position” on an issue “associated with” a political party and limited 
accordingly during the pre-campaign as well as the campaign period. 
The definition is very broad indeed.18 
The scope of this term was not challenged in the BC FIPA case, nor 
disputed by the Supreme Court of Canada whose focus, as is explained 
below, was on the concept of “sponsorship”.19  
Section 264(1)(h) of the Election Act provides that if an individual or 
organization contravenes section 239, they have committed an offence 
and are liable to a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for up 
to a year, or both.20 
The B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association (FIPA) 
sought a declaration that the registration requirement found in section 
239(1) of the Act, to the extent that it applies to sponsors of election 
advertising who spend less than $500 in a given campaign period, 
infringes section 2(b) of the Charter, is not saved by section 1, and is 
therefore of no force and effect. Thus the constitutional challenge was 
targeted to the absence of a minimum threshold for registration — a 
measure adopted in many comparable legislative instruments across 
Canada and an important safety valve, designed to limit the impact of the 
registration requirement on individuals and small spenders. 
FIPA itself sought to engage in such small-scale election activities, 
and in particular, the homemade sign it sought to display (in addition to 
complying with the attribution requirements in the Act) read: “Make 
Freedom of Information Your Issue this election!!”.21 This homemade 
sign was raised in the pleadings and present in the evidentiary record 
before Court.22 The record before the Court was clear that the position 
taken for years by the Chief Electoral Officer (“CEO”), the independent 
officer of the legislature charged with enforcing the Election Act, was 
that section 239 captured self-expression including home-made signs 
created at low or no expense and displayed in windows and bumper 
                                                                                                                       
18 Reference re Election Act (B.C.), [2012] B.C.J. No. 2037, 2012 BCCA 394, at para. 20 
(B.C.C.A.), citing British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 
[2009] B.C.J. No. 619, 2009 BCSC 436, [2009] 11 W.W.R. 294 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2011] B.C.J. No. 1945, 
2011 BCCA 408, 343 D.L.R. (4th) 237 (B.C.C.A.). 
19 BC FIPA, supra, note 5, at para. 23. 
20 Election Act, supra, note 16. 
21 Notice of Civil Claim, at para. 5; Affidavit #2 of Marlene Dayman, made October 15, 2013, 
at Exhibit E.  
22 Id. 
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stickers.23 It is therefore not surprising that this was the position taken by 
the Attorney General in her Response to Civil Claim: 
The plaintiff pleads an intention to spend less than $500 on election 
advertising during the campaign period in the next election. On those 
facts, the plaintiff’s obligation is simply to file a one-page application 
for registration with the chief electoral officer. There are no additional 
requirements. The plaintiff effectively alleges that the obligation to file 
that one page application is a breach of freedom of expression.24 
The trial judge dismissed FIPA’s application. He found that section 
239 of the Act infringed the right of free expression under section 2(b) of 
the Charter, but concluded that the infringement was justified under 
section 1.25 Although the section 2(b) breach was characterized by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal majority as “obvious”26 it was again 
upheld under section 1. Justice Saunders, dissenting, found that the 
infringement of section 2(b) was not justified under section 1. 
After a rare oral hearing at the leave to appeal stage, FIPA was 
granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme 
Court of Canada rightly framed the issue on appeal as follows: “The 
question on appeal is whether [the registration requirement] is a 
reasonable and demonstrably justified limit on persons who convey 
political messages through small-scale election activities like displaying 
homemade signs in their windows, putting bumper stickers on their cars, 
or wearing T-shirts with political messages on them.”27 
The Court seemed to erroneously believe that despite the record 
described above, the scope of the infringement was not the subject of 
consideration in the courts below because it held: “The courts below did 
not turn their attention to the first step of the constitutional analysis — that 
is determining the scope and nature of the limitation on free expression 
that the registration requirement in s. 239 imposes.”28 Although the 
section 2(b) infringement was conceded at the Supreme Court of Canada,29 
it was a contested issue before the trial judge, Cohen J. 
                                                                                                                       
23 Elections BC, “Guide to Election Communications for Third Party Advertising Sponsors”, at 12. 
24 Response to Civil Claim, at para. 7. 
25 B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2014] B.C.J. No. 688, 2014 BCSC 660 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “BC FIPA BCSC”]. 
26 B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2015] B.C.J. No. 774, 2015 BCCA 172, at para. 1 (B.C.C.A.). 
27 BC FIPA SCC, supra, note 5, at para. 2. 
28 Id., at para. 19. 
29 Id., at para. 2. 
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In the British Columbia Supreme Court, the Attorney General of 
British Columbia (the “Attorney General”) conceded only that the 
registration requirement captured conduct that fell within the protected 
sphere of conduct under section 2(b). It was argued, however, that 
there was no Charter breach of section 2(b) because the purpose of the 
provision was not to restrict speech, and because the burden of the 
registration requirement was so trivial or insubstantial that it did not 
warrant Charter protection.30 Justice Cohen found that the registration 
requirement had a restrictive effect on spontaneous political 
expression.31 In light of the “fundamental importance” of political 
expression, Cohen J. found that this provision infringed of section 2(b) 
of the Charter and that the infringement occasioned by section 239 of 
the Election Act was not “trivial or insubstantial”, as the Attorney 
General had argued.32  
No cross-appeal was pursued on this issue and thus the Attorney 
General conceded the breach of section 2(b) at the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, at the hearing of the appeal, the scope and 
nature of the limitation on free expression was again the subject of 
significant judicial interrogation and considered submissions by the 
parties. The Court questioned counsel extensively about the meaning of 
the word “sponsor” in the Act and whether it captured independent 
activity by a single person or entity or was restricted to a third person 
doing something on behalf of someone else.33  
FIPA’s submission in the British Columbia Court of Appeal was that 
the language of “sponsorship” in the Act referred to sponsoring an idea. 
Sponsorship could be undertaken by a single individual on their own 
behalf including by wearing a branded T-shirt or displaying a bumper 
sticker with “election advertising” on it, it was submitted.34 
The Court questioned the Attorney General on this issue who 
endorsed the interpretation posited by FIPA: 
SAUNDERS, J.A.: Is — is your friend correct that something such as a 
bumper sticker or a messaged T-shirt, technically under the legislation, 
worn or displayed during the currency of a — of a campaign would 
require registration? 
                                                                                                                       
30 BC FIPA BCSC, supra, note 25, at paras. 116-127. 
31 Id., at paras. 121, 142. 
32 Id., at paras. 123-126. 
33 Transcript of BCCA proceeding, at 9, 12. 
34 Id., at 12-14. 
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MS. HORSMAN: It would, My Lady, if it wasn’t caught by what I 
think my friend referred to as the archived provision. I mean, if it’s a 
bumper sticker that existed on a car — 
SAUNDERS, J.A.: Well, how about — 
MS. HORSMAN: — historically — 
SAUNDERS, J.A.: Yeah. How about a T-shirt? I mean, messaged T-
shirts are all over the place, you know. 
MS. HORSMAN: Yes. It — that could conceivably fall within the 
definition of election advertising. And just to be clear, there’s no 
dispute in this courtroom that the definition is very broad and captures 
a lot of speech. 
SAUNDERS, J.A.: A person doesn’t generally have to register to 
advance a view. We all grew up hearing about Hyde Park Corner with 
people able to stand on their soapbox and engage in political discourse, 
public discourse, all sorts of discourse. 
MS. HORSMAN: Yes, My Lady. And — and so the legislation that 
we’re concerned with here does depart from the general rule that you 
don’t have to register to engage in speech by requiring registration 
during a campaign period prior to a provincial election where the 
speech consists of political advertising. 
SAUNDERS, J.A.: That’s hugely broad. Because if there is ever a topic 
upon which one wants to encourage discussion, it is in the political 
public democratic process.35 
The Attorney General’s position at the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
was therefore consistent with evidence in the record of how the Act was 
being interpreted and enforced by the CEO. 
While maintaining her position on the scope of “election advertising”, 
at the Supreme Court of Canada, for the first time, the Attorney General 
advanced the argument that the registration requirement for those who 
“sponsor” election advertising had only limited application to the public 
broadcast of views on election issues by individuals and organizations 
acting on their own behalf for the purposes of self-expression. The 
primary argument was not that sponsorship required third party 
involvement but that “sponsoring election advertising captures only 
election advertising of greater-than-nil market value”.36 
                                                                                                                       
35 Id., at 43-44. 
36 Attorney General of British Columbia Factum, at para. 64. 
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The Court disregarded the Attorney General’s position that 
sponsorship captured self-expression as follows: 
It is true that, at one point in oral argument, counsel for the Attorney 
General of British Columbia appeared to concur in the suggestion that 
an individual who produces homemade signage containing an 
advertising message during an election campaign, having paid for the 
materials with which that signage is produced, could be a “sponsor of 
election advertising” for the purposes of the Act and subject to the 
registration requirement in s. 239. The Attorney General’s position on 
the record, however, is clear: s. 239 does not capture the cases of 
political expression on which the appellant relies.37 
Thus, the Court concluded that the registration requirement did not catch 
small-scale election advertising that it had correctly identified as the very 
subject of the question on appeal38 and it dismissed the appeal.39 
The Court held that section 239: 
[I]s directed only at those who undertake organized advertising 
campaigns — that is, “sponsors” who either pay for advertising 
services or who receive those services without charge as a contribution. 
In no case does the registration requirement apply to those engaged in 
individual self-expression. 
… 
For the reasons discussed, I conclude that a “sponsor” required to 
register is an individual or organization who receives a service from 
another individual or organization in undertaking an election 
advertising campaign, whether in exchange for payment or without 
charge as a contribution. Individuals engaged in political self-
expression do not come within the definition of “sponsor” in s. 229(1), 
and need not register.40 
The Court noted the implications of its interpretation of sponsorship 
extended beyond section 239 of the Act — the only provision challenged 
on the appeal: 
The foregoing interpretation limits not only the scope of the Act’s 
registration requirement, but also of its attribution requirement (s. 231), 
its disclosure requirement (s. 244) and its expenditure limits (s. 235.1).  
 
                                                                                                                       
37 BC FIPA SCC, supra, note 5, at para. 42. 
38 Id., at para. 2. 
39 Id., at para. 3. 
40 Id., at paras. 21 and 39. 
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An individual working entirely on his own, without paying for or 
receiving any service in the creation or dissemination of election 
advertising, is not required to comply with any of these provisions of 
the Act. This is consistent with the legislative purpose of the Act’s third 
party advertising provisions, which, as I have discussed, is to provide 
the public with information about those engaged in organized 
advertising campaigns during an election period, not to put conditions 
on individual self-expression. When an individual himself distributes 
handmade flyers, there is no question of who is responsible for that 
advertising, and so the attribution and disclosure provisions — like the 
registration requirement — would serve no purpose.41 
Despite the record of how the Act was being enforced on the ground, 
the Attorney General’s oral submissions at the Supreme Court of Canada 
and submissions at each previous hearing, the Court held that the 
interpretation it had arrived at was consistent with the Attorney General’s 
position “[t]hroughout this action”.42  
The Court had defined away the constitutional question that it had 
framed, that the courts below had considered, and that the appellant had 
advanced on appeal — the limit on the expressive rights of persons who 
convey political messages through small-scale election activities like 
displaying homemade signs in their windows, putting bumper stickers on 
their cars, or wearing T-shirts with political messages on them. The Court 
declined to opine upon the constitutional impact of this apparently erroneous 
interpretation of the legislation. Such a judgment might have been of some 
utility to those charged with enforcing the Act and who had to change their 
practices in response to the judgment. But no such guidance was given. 
Certainly respectful attention does not require courts to answer 
constitutional questions posed that the court judges to be the wrong question. 
However, having declined to address the issue framed (a course of action 
that is consistent with respectful attention), the Court ought to have ended its 
constitutional analysis. Instead, the Court identified a different Charter 
breach — “the limit on the expression of [newly defined] sponsors who 
receive services in undertaking election advertising campaigns and who 
spend less than $500 is justified under s. 1.”43 FIPA did not meet that 
definition and the Court correctly noted that no one — not even the appellant 
— contended this breach was unjustified under section 1.44 
                                                                                                                       
41 Id., at para. 40. 
42 Id., at para. 41. 
43 Id., at para. 46. 
44 Id., at para. 45. 
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Predictably, given the issue was uncontested and not supported by any 
factual record or submissions from the parties, the section 1 analysis that 
followed was thin and perhaps even the low watermark of section 1 
justification in the jurisprudence. Although section 1 justification 
generally requires “cogent and persuasive”45 evidence, in this case the 
Court opined that demonstrable justification under section 1 did not 
preclude justification of a Charter infringement despite a complete 
absence of “social science evidence”.46 That observation might not be too 
surprising except that in this case, not only was there no social science 
evidence, there was no evidence at all in aid of the Attorney General’s 
task of justification. Instead, the Court simply imagined possible 
deleterious and salutary effects of the law which it then upheld.47 
The Court’s analysis may be explicable by the fact that it was a purely 
hypothetical exercise based on a Charter breach it imagined and which 
was neither raised on the record before it nor championed by any party 
before it. While the analysis may be explicable, it nevertheless had 
unfortunate consequences not only for the development of the section 1 
jurisprudence but also, as is explained below, for the response to the 
decision that followed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision was pronounced January 26, 
2017. Section 239 was upheld so that no legislative response was 
required. But the reality, on the ground, was that a change in practice was 
required because the interpretation adopted by the Court was at odds 
with that understood by the CEO who was tasked with enforcing the Act. 
Less than a week after the judgment was released, on February 1, 2017, 
Elections BC issued a bulletin (mis)interpreting the Court’s decision 
entitled “Handmade Election Advertising”. Elections BC said this:  
To be a provincial election advertising sponsor, an individual must pay 
others for advertising services, receive free advertising services from 
others, or produce and personally hand-out more than 25 copies of 
homemade signs or pamphlets during the campaign period. Therefore, 
individuals who: 
1. use their own supplies and equipment to make their own election 
advertising materials, such as handmade signs or pamphlets,  
2. do not work with others on either preparing or transmitting the 
advertising, 
                                                                                                                       
45 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 138 (S.C.C.). 
46 BC FIPA SCC, supra, note 5, at para. 58. 
47 Id., at paras. 53-54. 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS 245 
3. make 25 or fewer of their own signs or pamphlets, and 
4. hand-deliver those signs or pamphlets directly to 25 or fewer other 
individuals  
are not advertising sponsors. 
There must be no question of who is responsible for the advertising. 
This means that the advertising must be hand-delivered directly to 
another person, not dropped in a mailbox or otherwise distributed 
anonymously.48 
There is no support in the BC FIPA judgment for any of the 
underlined portions in the above explanation of what it means to be an 
“election advertising sponsor”. Self-expression does not become 
sponsorship by a third party when a 25-copy threshold is passed. And 
again, the Court was express that “[i]n no case does the registration 
requirement apply to those engaged in individual self-expression.”49 Nor 
could there be any requirement for hand-delivery given that, as noted, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was express that the attribution requirements 
in the Act also do not apply to self-expression.50 
The Bulletin went on to say that “[g]roups of individuals or 
organizations that conduct any sort of election advertising are advertising 
sponsors and must register with Elections BC before sponsoring the 
advertising.”51 But the exclusion of groups is equally unsupportable 
given that the factual basis of the BC FIPA judgment was free expression 
made in the campaign period by FIPA, an organization, and the BC FIPA 
judgment made clear that organizations would not be considered 
“sponsors” so long as they were not engaging in paid advertising or 
receiving a service from another individual or organization in 
undertaking an election advertising campaign.  
How could Elections BC get it so wrong? One answer may be that 
Elections BC simply failed to consider and give weight to the Court’s 
judgment and failed to respond to the judgment itself rather than simply 
reiterating positions taken by the Attorney General. Another explanation 
is that the Court’s failure to address the Attorney General’s actual 
position resulted in a state of confusion stemming from the inconsistency  
 
                                                                                                                       
48 Emphasis added. This content is no longer accessible on <https://elections.bc.ca>. 
49 BC FIPA SCC, supra, note 5, at para. 21. 
50 Id., at para. 40. 
51 Bulletin, supra, note 48. 
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between what is said in the Court’s judgment, and how the proceedings 
actually unfolded. Elections BC would undoubtedly have been following 
the case and would have read the judgment. It would have been familiar 
with the Attorney General’s position advanced at each level of court. It 
would no doubt have been surprised and/or confused, then, to read a 
judgment so divorced from the Attorney General’s position which 
purported to side with it. An attempt to rationalize the position actually 
advanced by the Attorney General and the issues raised by the parties, 
with the judgment rendered by the Court might conceivably have 
resulted in misinterpretation of the judgment and ultimately the Bulletin 
that was issued.  
Of course, even if Elections BC had not misinterpreted the judgment, 
it could have had no understanding from it of the significance of the 
breach of section 2(b) Charter rights that the CEO’s (and at least on some 
occasions the Attorney General’s) historic or more recent interpretation 
of section 239 occasioned. Thus, it could not have factored in those 
Charter impacts in approaching how to best respond to the judgment. It 
would have understood, though, that even if such impacts were 
occasioned, they could apparently be justified in the absence of any 
evidence. In the result, Elections BC’s response to the judgment 
perpetuated many of the same constitutional problems raised by the 
parties and left unaddressed in BC FIPA — problems that could only be 
addressed by further litigation. That potential future litigation would 
have to contend with the poor section 1 analysis undertaken by the Court 
in the absence of any evidence or arguments to ground it.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has considered two case studies of arguably dysfunctional 
constitutional conversations.  
In Carter, the Court’s disregard of the factual matrix and considered 
submissions of the parties led to a judgment that was of less utility to 
Parliament (and the parties) than it might have been. Parliament’s failure 
to consider or give adequate weight to that judgment resulted in a 
parliamentary response that reiterated rationales and positions taken and 
addressed in the Carter litigation. This failure has resulted in sequel 
litigation in British Columbia that seeks only to vindicate the rights of 
those recognized by judgment in Carter but left behind by Parliament’s 
legislative response to it. One significant initial battleground in this 
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sequel litigation is the extent to which the findings of fact in Carter will 
be binding or will need to be proven again.52 The Carter judgment’s 
silence on some of the constitutional questions raised and Parliament’s 
response to that judgment, impose significant deleterious impacts on 
those individuals left behind by Parliament’s response and also on access 
to justice. 
In BC FIPA, the Court’s invention of a new constitutional issue that 
was neither developed in the factual matrix before it, nor addressed by 
the parties to the litigation, resulted in development of the section 1 
jurisprudence in a manner that occludes respectful attention in the 
courtroom. In particular, if demonstrable justification under section 1 
requires no evidence and no argument, it is hard to imagine how 
judgments will be responsive, understandable and of some utility to those 
who must respond to them. The Court’s disregard of the Attorney 
General’s position in the litigation and of how the Act was being 
enforced on the ground resulted in a judgment that appeared to be of 
little utility to Elections BC who ultimately had to respond to the 
judgment. Like the legislative response that followed Carter, the 
response here left many of the same constitutional rights in jeopardy. 
That issue would have to be addressed through further litigation although 
no sequel litigation has yet been initiated. 
Both Carter and BC FIPA serve as useful reminders to litigants that a 
court judgment is not an end in itself. The judgments of even the highest 
court must be interpreted, applied and responded to by others. Cases are 
carefully crafted, often on a pro bono basis, and argued through multiple 
levels of court over the course of many years. Even with pro bono legal 
assistance, for many litigants the incidental costs of such litigation are 
overwhelming and even insurmountable. Despite the extensive outlay of 
financial, temporal and human resources, often courts refuse to 
adjudicate upon constitutional arguments that are fully developed, likely 
because of a misplaced adherence to the principle of restraint. At other 
times, constitutional issues that are not disputed by the parties are 
adjudicated upon by the courts while the arguments advanced are 
disregarded. One solution to this morass is to insist on respectful 
                                                                                                                       
52 The plaintiffs have argued the factual findings from Carter are binding (pursuant to the 
doctrines of abuse of process or issue estoppel) unless they can be impeached by fresh evidence. The 
Attorney General has argued, and the British Columbia Supreme Court agreed, that the findings of fact 
from Carter Findings are not binding and may all be relitigated: Lamb v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2018] B.C.J. No. 1248, 2018 BCCA 266 (B.C.C.A.). Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
has been sought. Alison Latimer is co-counsel to the plaintiffs/appellants in Lamb. 
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attention when embarking upon a constitutional conversation. This 
respectful attention would ensure that dialogue theory fulfils its promise 
to promote legislative responses and ensure that those who must 
implement judgments are not disadvantaged in understanding the 
constraints that may exist on the range of constitutionally compliant 
responses left open by the litigation. Such respectful attention will also 
promote public respect for the judicial and legislative roles and, 
ultimately, promote rights recognition and access to justice.  
